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THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION: THE VIRTUES OF UNFETTERED
DISCRETION
Robert Klonoff*
INTRODUCTION
The federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) statute,1 enacted in 1968,
provides in relevant part that “[w]hen civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different [federal] districts, such actions may be
transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”2
Such transfers are ordered by a special panel, known as the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation (the “JPML”).3 The JPML determines whether to create
an MDL, and if so, it selects the judicial district and the individual judge to handle
the cases.4 The JPML consists of seven federal circuit and district court judges
designated by the Chief Justice of the United States (no two of whom can be from
the same circuit).5 The statute specifies no term of service for JPML members, but
in recent years, members of the JPML have served, on average, for ten years.6
Although the stated purpose of § 1407 is to achieve judicial efficiency in “pretrial
proceedings,”7 the reality is that only about three percent of the cases end up being
transferred back to the transferor courts for trial.8 The other ninety-seven percent
are resolved by the MDL judge, either through settlement or dismissal.9
The JPML’s decisions have profound consequences for our civil justice
system. A majority of the federal civil docket consists of MDL cases.10 Many of
Jordan D. Schnitzer Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I served as the academic member
of the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from 2011–2017. My research assistants, Jacob
Abbott and Hillary Fidler, provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. I also wish
to thank Judge Robert Dow, Professors Andrew Bradt and Rick Marcus, and attorney Elizabeth
Cabraser, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. This article reflects only my personal
thoughts, not those of other current or prior members of the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules.
1
28 U.S.C. § 1407.
2
§ 1407(a).
3
Id.
4
§ 1407(b).
5
§ 1407(d).
6
Margaret S. Williams & Tracey E. George, Who Will Manage Complex Litigation? The Decision
to Transfer and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424, 434 (2013).
7
§ 1407(a) (emphasis added).
8
Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the
Textbook Understandings of Civil Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2017).
9
Id.
10
As of September 30, 2018, MDL cases constituted 51.9 percent of the civil caseload in the federal
district courts. Fact Sheet: Why Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Need to be Designed to Apply to
Multidistrict Litigation Cases, RULES 4 MDLS, https://www.rules4mdls.com/fact-sheet (last visited
July 16, 2020). (These numbers exclude Social Security cases and cases brought by prisoners, other
than death penalty cases). Because the average MDL case “lasts about twice as long” as non-MDL
cases, some commentators focus on the percentage of civil cases filed each year that are included in
MDL proceedings. Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on the Federal
Judiciary Over the Past 50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV. 1245, 1271 (2019). That number has been as high
as 21 percent in recent years, still a very high percentage. Id. at 1272.
*
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the cases (especially the mass tort cases) could not have been certified as class
actions because individualized issues predominated over common issues.11 Thus,
MDL has served a critical role of achieving aggregation in cases that could not
proceed as class actions. Because MDLs play such an important role in federal
civil litigation, it is not surprising that judges, lawyers, and scholars have debated
whether various aspects of the MDL process should be reformed.
The possibility of civil rule changes focusing on MDL practice has been
taken up by a Subcommittee of the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
(“MDL Subcommittee”). Since November 2017, the MDL Subcommittee has been
examining numerous possible reform proposals, urged primarily by the defense
bar and various academics. Interestingly, however, there has been virtually no
focus on reforming the JPML’s decision-making process. Instead, the focus has
been entirely on reforms addressed to the MDL judges assigned to handle the
cases. Thus, in its most recent public statements (from April and May 2020), the
MDL Subcommittee has focused on early judicial review of the strength of claims;
interlocutory appellate review of orders of MDL judges; review of settlements by
MDL judges; MDL judges’ appointment of leadership attorneys; and the awarding
of attorneys’ fees in MDLs.12 Additional topics that the MDL Subcommittee has
examined include filing fees for MDL cases; criteria for master complaints; thirdparty litigation funding; and possible rules addressing the trial of test cases (known
as bellwether trials).13
At no time has the MDL Subcommittee indicated any interest in
considering rules or statutory recommendations relating to the JPML’s role in the
MDL process. Nor have any concrete proposals regarding the JPML’s decisionmaking process been put forward. Thus, I have seen no proposals urging more
stringent (or more relaxed) criteria governing the JPML’s decision whether to
centralize. Nor have I seen proposals urging specific criteria that the JPML should
use in selecting the district court and district judge to handle specific MDL cases.
The only criticism I have seen regarding the JPML process is that the JPML could
do a better job in selecting a diverse array of MDL judges.14 And those arguments
ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL § 1.4 at 13 (2020)
(hereafter MDL NUTSHELL).
12
See, e.g., U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 490-508 (June 23,
2020), available at https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06_standing_agenda_book.pdf
(containing May 27, 2020 summary of the MDL Subcommittee’s work); U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
145-64
(Apr.
1,
2020),
available
at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/04-2020_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf.
13
See U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 207-20 (Apr. 2–3, 2019), available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2019-04_civil_rules_agenda_book.pdf; U.S. COURTS,
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 154-57 (Nov. 1, 2018), available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11_civil_rules_agenda_book_0.pdf.
14
See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew D. Bradt, Party Preferences in Multidistrict Litigation,
107 CAL. L. REV. 1713, 1718, 1734 (2019) (reviewing MDL assignments from 2012–2016 and
observing that “…while the Panel’s choices have mostly matched the racial and gender diversity of
the federal bench, that is a low bar that we do not mean to endorse”). “In the largest MDLs, transferee
judges are more likely to be male and white than federal district judges overall. Meanwhile, new
MDL judges are slightly more likely to be female and liberal than the pool overall, but not
dramatically so. New MDL judges are not more racially diverse than the pool overall.” Id. at 1734.
11
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have been only general criticisms that the JPML should be more attentive to
diversity; no one (to my knowledge) has proposed quotas or other specific statutory
or rule changes governing the selection of MDL judges.
This lack of focus on the JPML process as a subject for reform is
remarkable; the decision to create an MDL, and the decision to designate a
particular district court and judge, are profoundly important. Indeed, the success
or failure of an entire category of litigation may turn on whether the cases are
centralized in an MDL, and if so, which judge is designated to oversee the cases.
One would think that the plaintiffs’ bar, the defense bar, or both would have strong
views on those issues. This has not been the case. Nonetheless, although there is
no groundswell of support for reform of the JPML’s role, it is worth considering
whether reform would be useful. The MDL Subcommittee is now focused on MDL
reform, and once this opportunity passes, it could be a decade or more before the
rules process again focuses on MDL reform.
Section I of this article examines the virtually unlimited discretion of the
JPML in making its decisions. It explains that, under the current scheme, it is
virtually impossible to challenge the JPML’s crucial decisions. Section II
considers possible areas of reform, but ultimately concludes that any attempt to
constrain the JPML’s virtually unlimited discretion would be difficult to codify
and, ultimately, self-defeating. As Section II explains, the JPML is doing an
excellent job, and there is no indication that it needs to be reined in through the
adoption of more rigorous and explicit criteria for determining whether to
centralize cases and selecting the district courts and judges for MDL assignments.
I. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS OF THE JPML
The JPML makes two critical decisions: (1) whether to grant
centralization, and (2) if so, which district court and district judge should be
assigned to oversee the cases.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have little or no relevance to the
JPML’s work because the JPML does not manage cases, oversee discovery, rule
on dispositive motions, or conduct trials.15 Moreover, while the MDL statute
provides broad criteria for determining whether transfer should be ordered, it offers
no details.16 And the statute offers no guidance whatsoever on the criteria for
selecting either the MDL district court or the MDL district judge.17 Although the
JPML has promulgated its own rules of procedure,18 those rules relate mainly to
administrative and mechanical matters, such as filing deadlines and other matters
relating to briefing and oral argument. The rules say nothing about the decision to
centralize or the criteria for selecting the district court and judge.
See DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 1:1 (2020). Of course, the Federal
Rules are directly relevant to the judges who are assigned to oversee MDL cases. See, e.g., In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., 956 F.3d 838, 841 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that MDL judges cannot
“disregard[]” the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
16
See infra Section IA.
17
See infra Section IB.
18
See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 78 F.D.R. 561 (1978).
15
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As discussed in Sections IA and IB, the standards applied by the JPML in
making its crucial decisions vary from case to case, with decisions in one putative
MDL having little or no precedential value in other cases. And as discussed in
Section IC, under the MDL statute, the JPML’s decisions are almost entirely
unreviewable. There is no review, even by extraordinary writ, for a decision
denying transfer.19 And decisions in favor of transfer (as well as the selection of
the district courts and judges) are reviewable only by extraordinary writ, not by
appeal. Moreover, under the strict mandamus standard, the JPML has almost never
been second-guessed by any federal appellate court. 20 As a practical matter,
therefore, the JPML’s decisions are unreviewable.
A. The Decision Whether to Transfer
A potential MDL action may be initiated by any party in any constituent
action, or by the JPML on its own motion.21 The JPML decides whether
centralization is warranted after considering the statutory criteria, i.e., looking at
whether there are “one or more common questions of fact,”22 and whether an MDL
“will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions.”23 Although the JPML typically issues
written opinions explaining its rulings, those decisions are conclusory (often only
a couple of pages), and as a practical matter those rulings do not constrain the
JPML’s decisions in other cases. Indeed, as discussed below, the decisions are
heavily fact-specific and often appear to be contradictory.
First, with respect to whether there is a common question of fact, the JPML
sometimes finds that a single issue of fact is sufficient, even if there are many
individualized issues. This can be seen, for example, in a number of mass tort
cases.24 Yet, the JPML sometimes denies transfer, even when indisputable
common questions of fact exist, reasoning that individualized factual questions
predominated over the common questions.25 In these latter cases, the JPML has
28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
See infra Section IC (discussing research revealing only a single case granting mandamus against
the JPML).
21
§ 1407(c).
22
§ 1407(a).
23
Id.
24
See, e.g., In re Zostavax (Zoster Vaccine Live) Prods. Liab. Litig., 330 F. Supp. 3d 1378, 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2018) (holding that numerous civil actions based on alleged injuries from a shingles
vaccine involved common questions of fact and warranted transfer to MDL proceedings; although
each plaintiff had individualized injuries, those variations were “not an obstacle” because the claims
“share[d] a common factual core”); In re Davol, Inc./C.R. Bard, Inc., Polypropylene Hernia Mesh
Prods. Liab. Litig., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1380, 1380–81 (J.P.M.L. 2018) (holding that numerous civil
actions alleging defects in the defendants’ hernia mesh product involved common questions of fact
despite the plaintiffs’ claims of individualized injuries).
25
See, e.g., In re Table Saw Prods. Liab. Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1384, 1384 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (denying
centralization of dozens of actions involving injuries from allegedly defective table saws, noting that
the “common issues [were] overshadowed by the non-common ones” because “[e]ach action arises
from an individual accident that occurred under necessarily unique circumstances”); In re
Ambulatory Pain Pump-Chondrolysis Prods. Liab. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1377 (J.P.M.L.
19
20
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applied a more exacting test (similar to a class action under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3)) than simply the presence of a single common question of fact.
The JPML can decide how rigorous it wants to be in applying the common question
of fact test.
Second, the JPML rarely discusses the statutory convenience and
justice/efficiency criteria as freestanding tests.26 And when it does, it usually does
so in a conclusory fashion, which makes it difficult for counsel who are arguing
for or against centralization in a particular set of cases to identify overarching
principles. For instance, the JPML has noted, with little elaboration, that
“[c]entralization will eliminate duplicative discovery; prevent inconsistent pretrial
rulings . . . and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel, and the
judiciary.”27 The JPML has taken into account party preferences and agreements
in determining convenience.28 But as a practical matter, the convenience and
justice/efficiency tests do not constrain the JPML’s discretion in deciding whether
to centralize. Indeed, when cases are spread out in multiple states, as is common
in putative MDLs, what is convenient for some parties and attorneys will
necessarily be inconvenient for others.
Third, the JPML has cited other criteria in deciding whether to transfer but
has done so inconsistently. For instance, the presence of multiple defendants or
products has sometimes defeated a request for an overarching MDL,29 but in other
cases it has not.30 The JPML has sometimes found that consolidation was
unnecessary because coordination among judges and attorneys in various cases

2010) (rejecting centralization of mass tort personal injury cases in part because “individual issues
of causation and liability . . . predominate, and are likely to overwhelm any efficiencies that might
be gained by centralization”); In re Mortg. Lender Force-Placed Ins. Litig., 895 F. Supp. 2d 1352,
1353 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (denying centralization of multiple actions involving alleged abusive practices
in the banking and insurance industry, finding that “[c]ommon questions of fact . . . do not
predominate”).
26
See MDL NUTSHELL § 3.4 (discussing cases).
27
In re Uber Techs., Inc., Data Sec. Breach Litig., 304 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2018); see
also In re Local TV Adver. Antitrust Litig., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1343 (J.P.M.L. 2018) (using same
language).
28
See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1363–
64 (J.P.M.L. 2018) (noting that “[a]ll responding parties agree that the actions share factual issues,”
and that centralization was supported by numerous responding plaintiffs and defendants); In re Opana
ER Antitrust Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1408, 1409 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (centralizing actions when “[a]ll
plaintiffs and defendants in the actions support centralization”); In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition
Switch Litig., 26 F. Supp. 3d 1390, 1390 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (same).
29
See, e.g., In re Power Morcellator Prods. Liab. Litig., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (J.P.M.L. 2015)
(declining to create an industry-wide MDL against multiple defendants that manufactured allegedly
defective power morcellators used for surgical procedures); In re Yellow Brass Plumbing Component
Prods. Liab. Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (declining centralization in multi-defendant
litigation challenging the chemical composition of certain plumbing components).
30
See, e.g., In re AndroGel Prods. Liab. Litig., 24 F. Supp. 3d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (finding that
centralization was appropriate in cases against numerous defendants alleging injuries from the use of
testosterone replacement therapies); In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375,
1377–78 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (centralizing numerous claims against multiple defendants in an MDL
involving “the alleged improper marketing of and inappropriate distribution of various prescription
opiate medications into cities, states and towns across the country”).
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could occur informally,31 but in other cases it has found that informal coordination
would not suffice and that formal MDL treatment was necessary.32 In some
instances, the possibility of transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)33 has been
a reason to deny centralization,34 but in other cases the JPML will centralize cases
notwithstanding the availability of a Section 1404 transfer.35 In some instances, the
JPML has transferred cases despite different kinds of plaintiffs (e.g., private
plaintiffs and government entities),36 but in other cases, the existence of different
kinds of plaintiffs has prevented transfer or has prompted the JPML to create
multiple MDLs.37 Similarly, the fact that various lawsuits raise different types of
claims or allegations is sometimes a basis for denying centralization.38 At other
times that factor is not a basis for denying transfer.39 At times, the extent of plaintiff
or defense opposition to MDL transfer has been an important factor in denying
transfer,40 but at other times transfer has been ordered despite significant

31
See, e.g., In re Uponor, Inc., F1960 Plumbing Fittings Prods. Liab. Litig., 895 F. Supp. 2d 1346,
1349 (J.P.M.L. 2012); In re Dry Bean Revenue Prot. Crop Ins. Litig., 350 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1382
(J.P.M.L. 2018).
32
See, e.g., In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2724, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67521, at *2 (J.P.M.L. May 3, 2017); In re Viagra (Sildenafil Citrate) Prods. Liab. Litig., 224 F.
Supp. 3d 1330, 1331 (J.P.M.L. 2016).
33
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.”
34
See, e.g., In re Best Buy Co., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2011); In re Gerber Probiotic
Prods., Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 899 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380–81 (J.P.M.L. 2012).
35
See, e.g., In re Natrol, Inc. Glucosamine/Chondroitin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 26 F. Supp.
3d 1392, 1393 (J.P.M.L. 2014); In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1388, 1390
(J.P.M.L. 2004).
36
See, e.g., In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2724, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
67521, at *2 (J.P.M.L. May 3, 2017) (finding that the actions brought by the states could be handled
as part of the existing MDL involving private plaintiffs); In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg.,
Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL 2672, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103485, at *2 (J.P.M.L.
Aug. 5, 2016) (same).
37
See, e.g., In re Pfizer Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1367–68 (J.P.M.L.
2009) (denying centralization of claims alleging that defendants “engaged in a fraudulent scheme
and conspiracy to promote eleven different prescription drugs” because “the named plaintiffs allege
that they themselves each took only one of those eleven drugs, and that neither took the same drug
as the other”); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356
(J.P.M.L. 2010) (centralizing claims for personal and economic injuries arising from Deepwater
Horizon oil spill); In re BP p.l.c. Secs. Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (creating
a separate MDL for securities and ERISA claims arising from Deepwater Horizon oil spill).
38
See, e.g., In re Urban Outfitters Fair Labor Standards Act, 987 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1382 (J.P.M.L.
2013) (denying centralization of actions for unpaid overtime because there appeared to be
“substantial variation between the duties of the subject employees,” and “their allegations differ[ed]
markedly from action to action”).
39
See, e.g., Dabon v. GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (In re Avandia Mktg.), 528 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (J.P.M.L.
2007) (centralizing marketing, sales practices, and product liability claims in a single MDL); In re
Vytorin/Zetia Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 543 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2008)
(same).
40
See, e.g., In re CVS Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Emp. Practices Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1377,
1379 (J.P.M.L. 2010); In re “Lite Beer” Trademark Litig., 437 F. Supp. 754, 755–56 (J.P.M.L. 1977).

https://irlaw.umkc.edu/lawreview/vol89/iss4/21

6

Klonoff: The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: The Virtues of Un

2021]

THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

1009

opposition.41 Similarly, although certain types of cases tend to be especially
suitable for transfer, there are no hard-and-fast rules.42 The JPML has emphasized
that it does not “rubber stamp in any docket.”43 In short, the JPML is all over the
map in assessing the appropriateness of centralization, with the tests seemingly
changing depending on whether the JPML wishes to grant or deny centralization.
B. Decision Regarding the JPML’s Selection of the Transferee District and
Transferee Judge
1. Selection of District Court
The JPML invokes a variety of factors in selecting the transferee district.
But here again, the JPML has articulated no formula or standard for selecting the
district court. Depending on the case, the JPML may be persuaded by a single
factor or a confluence of factors, and factors that might be pivotal in one MDL
may be given little or no weight in another.44
Party Preferences. While the JPML may select any federal district court
in the country, it is more likely to select a court for which the parties have

41
See, e.g., In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2003); In re
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415, 416–17 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
42
For instance, the JPML has noted that air crash cases are often suitable for MDL treatment. See,
e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (J.P.M.L. 1969); In re Air
Crash Near Rio Grande, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (J.P.M.L. 2011). Yet, the JPML has not hesitated to
deny transfer in air crash cases. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Lake Wales, Fla. on June 7, 2012, 118
F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2015); Harp v. Airblue, Ltd. (In re Air Crash Near Islamabad,
Pak.), 777 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2011). Likewise, the JPML has frequently granted
centralization in antitrust cases. See, e.g., In re Ranbaxy Generic Drug Application Antitrust Litig.,
355 F. Supp. 3d 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2019); In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig. No. III, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1353
(J.P.M.L. 2017). But it has also denied centralization in such cases. See, e.g., In re Dental Supplies
& Equip. Antitrust Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1330–31 (J.P.M.L. 2018); In re H&R Block
Employee Antitrust Litig., 355 F. Supp. 3d 1380 (J.P.M.L. 2019).
43
In re CVS Caremark Corp. Wage & Hour Emp. Practices Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1379
(J.P.M.L. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
44
See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1165, 1215 (2017) (“When assigning cases to a transferee judge, the JPML gives a variety of reasons.
What matters in one case may not matter in another. What one can say about JPML transfer orders
is that they seem to give decent, practical reasons for choosing the transferee court and judge. But it
is also fair to say that those reasons vary considerably”).
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expressed a preference.45 Yet, in many cases the JPML has given little weight to
party preferences.46
Location of Parties, Witnesses, and Evidence. The JPML often tries to
select a convenient transferee court for the litigants. But when parties are
geographically dispersed, it is impossible to choose a convenient venue for
everyone, and often the JPML will either favor some parties over others47 or find
a compromise venue somewhere in the geographical center.48 Sometimes (but not
always) the JPML will pick the district where the defendant is located.49 The JPML
has often cited the location of relevant documents and witnesses as an important
consideration in selecting the transferee district,50 but in other cases that factor has
not been given substantial (or any) weight.51 Of course, if the witnesses and
See, e.g., In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1326
(J.P.M.L. 2017) (selecting the Northern District of Georgia as the transferee court in part because
that district was “supported by defendants and the vast majority of responding plaintiffs”); In re
Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402, 1405 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (choosing the
Eastern District of Louisiana as the transferee court, the JPML noted that the district had “the support
of a number of plaintiffs and also [was] supported by the opposing defendants as an appropriate
alternative”).
46
See, e.g., In re Subway Footlong Sandwich Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 949 F. Supp. 2d 1369,
1370 (J.P.M.L. 2013) (centralizing cases in Eastern District of Wisconsin, despite the fact that all
parties supported the Northern District of Illinois); In re Biomet M2A Magnum Hip Implant Prods.
Liab. Litig., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1340 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (centralizing cases in Northern District of
Indiana, “even though no party suggested it and no plaintiff ha[d] yet filed a case there”).
47
See, e.g., In re Hard Disk Drive Suspension Assemblies Antitrust Litig., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1374,
1375 (J.P.M.L. 2019) (centralizing cases in Northern District of California, over the opposition of
responding defendants); In re Uber Techs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1355 (J.P.M.L. 2018)
(transferring cases to the Central District of California, despite the fact that a number of responding
plaintiffs supported other districts).
48
See, e.g., In re Library Editions of Children’s Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (case
in which constituent actions spanned the country, with many actions in California and on the East
Coast; JPML transferred all actions to the Northern District of Illinois, noting that “there is . . .
something to be said for the convenience of a geographically central forum in coast-to-coast
litigation”); In re Sonic Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 276 F. Supp. 3d 1382, 1383
(J.P.M.L. 2017) (centralizing cases in the Northern District of Ohio, “a centrally-located and easily
accessible location”); In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (J.P.M.L.
2017) (centralizing cases in the Northern District of Ohio, “a geographically central and accessible
forum”).
49
See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg. Sales Practices & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (picking district where defendant is located); In
re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1322, 1326 (J.P.M.L. 2017)
(same); but see, e.g., In re Ethicon Physiomesh Flexible Composite Hernia Mesh Prods. Liab. Litig.,
254 F. Supp. 3d 1381, 1383 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (choosing district other than the defendant’s location);
In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep EcoDiesel Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 3d
1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
50
See, e.g., In re Uber Techs., Inc., Data Sec. Breach Litig., 304 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1355 (J.P.M.L.
Apr. 4, 2018); In re BP p.l.c. Secs. Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2010); Dabon v.
GlaxoSmithKline, Inc. (In re Avandia Mktg.), 528 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1341 (J.P.M.L. 2007).
51
See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2017)
(centralizing cases in the Northern District of Ohio with no mention of the location of relevant
documents or witnesses); In re Samsung Top-Load Washing Mach. Mktg., 278 F. Supp. 3d 1376,
1378 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (centralizing cases in the Western District of Oklahoma without mention of the
location of relevant documents or witnesses).
45
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evidence are dispersed across the country, this factor necessarily takes on much
less significance.52
Location of Pending Actions. The JPML has often found the location of
the various actions to be relevant to the choice of transferee court.53 In other cases,
however, the location of various actions has not been dispositive or even
important.54
Docket Conditions of Potential Transferee Courts. The JPML
sometimes cites the light workload of a transferee district in selecting a district.55
At other times, the JPML may find a district attractive if it has few or no pending
MDL cases.56 Nonetheless, the JPML frequently selects districts in major urban
areas that already have many MDLs or are otherwise very busy with existing
cases.57
Location of First-Filed Action. In a number of decisions, the JPML has
referred to the location of the first-filed action as supporting a particular transferee
court.58 But in many other cases, the venue of the first-filed action is not selected.59
See, e.g., In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., 148 F.
Supp. 3d 1367, 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (noting that “any number of transferee districts could ably
handle this litigation,” given that the controversy “touches multiple districts across the United States
and that the various VW entities hold ties to many districts”).
53
See, e.g., In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Antitrust Litig., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1345–46 (J.P.M.L.
2010) (selecting the District of Minnesota, in part because seven of the ten actions were already
pending in that district); In re Total Body Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1382
(J.P.M.L. 2008) (finding that the Northern District of Alabama was an appropriate transfer district,
given that fourteen of the twenty actions were pending there).
54
See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992)
(transferring cases to district and judge with no pending cases); In re BP p.l.c. Secs. Litig., 734 F.
Supp. 2d 1376, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (transferring cases to Southern District of Texas and noting
that the fact “that no constituent action is currently pending in the Southern District of Texas is not
an impediment to its selection as the transferee district”) (citation omitted).
55
See, e.g., In re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., Patent Litig., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1336 (J.P.M.L.
2012) (selecting the Western District of Pennsylvania in part because that district “enjoy[ed]
favorable caseload conditions”); see also In re Halftone Color Separations (’809) Patent Litig., 547
F. Supp. 2d 1383, 1385 (J.P.M.L. 2008) (“Current docket conditions in the Eastern District of Texas
counsel against assignment of this MDL to that district where other appropriate districts are available
to handle the litigation.”) (citation omitted).
56
See, e.g., In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1346–47 (J.P.M.L.
2009) (noting that the transferee district “currently is home to only one multidistrict litigation
proceeding”); In re Total Body Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1382 (J.P.M.L.
2008) (selection of transferee district was supported by the fact that “no multidistrict litigation
dockets [were] currently pending” there).
57
See, e.g., In re Nine West LBO Secs. Litig., 2020 WL 2847269 (J.P.M.L. 2020) (transferring cases
to Southern District of New York); In re ZF-TRW Airbag Control Units Prods. Liab. Litig., 410 F.
Supp. 3d 1357, 1361 (J.P.M.L. 2019) (transferring cases to Central District of California).
58
See, e.g., In re Smith & Nephew BHR & R3 Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 249 F. Supp. 3d 1348,
1352 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (selecting transferee district in part because the first-filed action was pending
there); In re GMAC Ins. Mgmt. Corp. Overtime Pay Litig., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1358 (J.P.M.L.
2004) (same).
59
See, e.g., In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 291 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1369 (J.P.M.L. 2018)
(transferring cases to the Northern District of Illinois, even though the first-filed action was filed in
another district); In re Unified Messaging Sols. LLC Patent Litig., 883 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1342
(J.P.M.L. 2012) (same).
52
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Coordination with Other Proceedings. At times, the JPML will consider
the possibility of coordinating MDL proceedings with other judicial proceedings.
If a potential district is located where criminal, civil, or bankruptcy proceedings
relating to the MDL are taking place, the JPML may be inclined to transfer the
MDL to that district.60 But the JPML has also frequently rejected the possibility of
coordination with related proceedings as a reason for selecting a particular venue.61
2. Selection of District Judge
Transferee Judge Is Presiding over Some Pending Cases. A transferee
judge is frequently selected because that judge is already presiding over one or
more of the pending cases.62 But in a number of cases, that factor has not been
decisive or even mentioned.63
Experience of the Judge. The experience of potential transferee judges in
complex litigation generally or in MDLs specifically is sometimes a factor in the
JPML’s selection determination.64 But the JPML frequently selects judges as being
“experienced” without referencing specific experience, if any, in complex

60
See, e.g., In re Orthopaedic Implant Device Antitrust Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1355 (J.P.M.L.
2007) (transferee district was “where related grand jury proceedings [were] located”); In re Neurontin
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1351–52 (J.P.M.L. 2004) (transferee district
was “where a False Claims Act qui tam action predicated on the same facts as those at issue in the
[MDL] actions had been pending for eight years” prior to settlement).
61
See, e.g., In re Am. Med. Collection Agency, Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 410 F. Supp.
3d 1350, 1354 n.9 (J.P.M.L. 2019) (declining to transfer cases to the district where a defendant’s
bankruptcy was pending, JPML noted that “the transferee judge and the bankruptcy judge need not
sit in the same district to be able to coordinate informally on matters arising in the MDL that implicate
the bankruptcy proceeding”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); In re Takata Airbag
Prods. Liab. Litig., 84 F. Supp. 3d 1371, 1373 n.4 (J.P.M.L. 2015) (same).
62
See, e.g., In re Natrol, Inc. Glucosamine/Chondroitin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 26 F. Supp.
3d 1392, 1394 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (noting that the transferee judge selected was “presid[ing] over two
MDLs that raise[d] similar factual and legal claims concerning the effectiveness of dietary
supplements containing glucosamine and chondroitin in promoting joint health”); In re Ford Motor
Co. DPS6 PowerShift Transmission Prods. Liab. Litig., 289 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2018)
(noting that the transferee judge was already presiding over several actions); In re Lipitor
(Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig. No. II, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354,
1357 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (same).
63
See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992)
(transferring cases to district and judge with no pending cases); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
“Deepwater Horizon,” 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1356 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (assigning cases to a judge
without explicitly relying on the fact that multiple cases were already pending before the transferee
judge).
64
See, e.g., In re Qualcomm Antitrust Litig., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1373, 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (“[W]e
select a jurist with multidistrict litigation experience and the ability to steer this complicated litigation
on an efficient and prudent course.”); In re Chrysler-Dodge-Jeep EcoDiesel Mktg. Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (judge selected was “well-versed in
the nuances of complex and multidistrict litigation”).
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litigation or MDLs.65 And the JPML is also willing (as it must be) to select judges
with no prior MDL experience.66
The Judge’s Workload. The JPML sometimes relies on a district’s light
or manageable workload in selecting the particular district and judge.67 In other
cases, however, the JPML will select a judge from a district with heavy docket
conditions68 or will make a selection without any reference to workload
considerations.69
C. Appellate Review
Consistent with the statutory framework, there is virtually no opportunity
for a litigant to challenge either the JPML’s decision whether to create an MDL or
its selection of the district court or district judge. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, judicial
review of JPML decisions is severely constrained. Mandamus is available for a
decision granting centralization (and for decisions regarding the selection of the
district court and district judge),70 but the mandamus standard is exceedingly
difficult to satisfy. To obtain mandamus, a petitioner must demonstrate that it has
a “clear and indisputable” right to the issuance of the writ.71 Moreover, under
§1407(e), even the narrow remedy of mandamus is unavailable to challenge JPML

See, e.g., In re ZF-TRW Airbag Control Units Prods. Liab. Litig., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1357, 1361
(J.P.M.L. 2019) (“[the judge] to whom we assign the litigation, is an experienced jurist, and already
is presiding over nine of the ten Central District of California actions”); In re Hill’s Pet Nutrition,
Inc., Dog Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1351 (J.P.M.L. 2019) (noting only that
“[the judge] to whom we assign the litigation, is an experienced jurist”).
66
See, e.g., In re TransUnion Rental Screening Sol., Inc., FCRA Litig., 437 F. Supp. 3d 1377, 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2020) (“assign[ing] this litigation to an able jurist who has not yet had the opportunity to
preside over an MDL.”); In re Sorin 3T Heater–Cooler Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig. No. II, 289 F. Supp.
3d 1335, 1337 (J.P.M.L. 2018) (transferring cases to “an experienced jurist who has not had the
opportunity to preside over an MDL”).
67
See, e.g., In re Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., Patent Litig., 867 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1336 (J.P.M.L.
2012) (selecting the Western District of Pennsylvania in part because that district “enjoy[ed]
favorable caseload conditions”); In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d
1346, 1346 (J.P.M.L. 2009) (noting that the transferee district “currently is home to only one
multidistrict litigation proceeding”).
68
See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab.
Litig., 704 F. Supp. 2d 1379, 1382 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (rejecting the argument that “docket conditions”
in the Central District of California made that district a poor candidate for an MDL, the JPML
concluded that the transferee judge was “positioned to devote all the time necessary to manage and
decide the important issues that these cases raise”); In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 560 F.
Supp. 2d 1381, 1382–83 (J.P.M.L. 2008) (assigning MDL to the District of Delaware over a
defendant’s argument that the JPML should select another district with “more favorable docket
conditions”).
69
See, e.g., In re Samsung Top-Load Washing Mach. Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,
278 F. Supp. 3d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2017) (centralizing cases before a judge in the Western District
of Oklahoma without mention of workload); In re Epipen Mktg., 268 F. Supp. 3d 1356, 1360
(J.P.M.L. 2017) (centralizing cases before a judge in the District of Kansas without mention of
workload).
70
28 U.S.C. § 1407(e).
71
Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004).
65
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decisions denying centralization,72 meaning that review is unavailable even in
theory. Not surprisingly, mandamus is only rarely sought to challenge a JPML
decision, and virtually all such requests are denied.73 Indeed, the author has found
only one case since the adoption of the MDL statute in 1968 granting mandamus
to overturn a JPML decision transferring cases.74
II. WHETHER PRECISE STATUTORY OR RULE CHANGES ARE
NECESSARY TO CABIN THE DECISIONS OF THE JPML
As discussed in Section I, the JPML is essentially unconstrained in
whether to create an MDL and the criteria it uses to select the district court and
judge. While there are at least nominal criteria for deciding whether to centralize—
i.e., the existence of common questions of fact and the advancement of
convenience and efficiency—there are no criteria whatsoever in the statute or the
JPML’s rules regarding the selection of the district court and judge. One would
think, therefore, that at least some scholars or practitioners would favor reform of
the JPML’s decision-making process, and that they would have offered proposed
statutory or rule changes to constrain the JPML’s decisions or make them more
consistent. But there have been no such calls for reform, other than some general
calls for the JPML to be more receptive to diversifying the pool of MDL judges.75
A basic concept of medicine is “first do no harm.” That principle should
also apply in the consideration of any proposed statutory or rule change. In my
view, the JPML is doing an excellent job, and there is no need for statutory or rule
changes.
I have read countless JPML transfer decisions. On the issue of whether to
create an MDL, I cannot recall a single opinion in which I concluded that the JPML
was either egregiously wrong in declining centralization or egregiously wrong in
ordering it. Perhaps there are cases at the margin that were not centralized that
arguably should have been. But in those situations, the statute provides no review,
not even mandamus review, and there are strong arguments for not allowing review
of a decision denying MDL treatment—including the burdens placed on appellate
courts and the delays in the underlying litigation that such appellate challenges
would necessarily cause. Moreover, it is hard for parties to argue that they have
72
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (“There shall be no appeal or review of an order of the JPML denying a
motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated proceedings.”).
73
MDL NUTSHELL § 5.6 (discussing several cases in which mandamus was denied).
74
Royster v. Food Lion (In re Food Lion), 73 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 1996) (ordering that the JPML return
the remanded cases to the transferee court so that the appeals from the summary judgment rulings
could all be heard by the Fourth Circuit).
75
See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, A Legal Fempire?: Women in Complex Litigation, 93 IND. L.J.
617, 635 (2018); Amanda Bronstad, Women Attorneys Secure Record Number of Lead Counsel
Appointments in MDLs in 2018, LAW.COM (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:40 AM),
https://www.law.com/2019/03/06/women-attorneys-secure-record-number-of-lead-counselappointments-in-mdls-in-2018/?slreturn=20200921233607. Accord, e.g., Margaret S. Williams, The
Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on the Federal Judiciary over the Past 50 Years, 53 GA. L. REV.
1245, 1283-84 (2019) (citing empirical evidence that “the percentage of non-white and female
transferee judges chosen by the JPML has increased over time”).
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been unfairly prejudiced by having to continue to litigate their cases without an
MDL procedure. After all, MDL is an exception to the default rule that cases are
litigated individually, unless another aggregation device, such as class action
treatment, joinder, or consolidation applies.
Importantly, the statute does not give any party the right to MDL
treatment; it merely states that the JPML “may” centralize cases when there are
“one or more common questions of fact” and the JPML “determin[es] that transfers
. . . will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just
and efficient conduct of such actions.”76 Given that the centralization decision is
itself so highly discretionary, it is hard to imagine a circumstance in which a JPML
decision denying transfer would be so profoundly wrong as to warrant mandamus.
Thus, the statute correctly forecloses mandamus regarding JPML decisions
denying centralization.
For similar reasons, given the flexibility inherent in the “common
question” and “convenience” criteria, it is hard to imagine that a JPML decision in
favor of centralization would be so profoundly wrong as to warrant mandamus.
Even the most conclusory findings of common questions and convenience would
appear to demonstrate that mandamus is not warranted. Indeed, the JPML does not
centralize cases unless it believes that there are strong arguments for that
approach.77 And if centralization proves to be unwise, the MDL judge can always
advise the JPML—which decides whether and when to remand cases78—that the
cases should be remanded to the transferor judges.
Likewise, I cannot recall a single JPML decision in which, in my view, the
selection of the district court or district judge was so illogical or wrongheaded as
to demonstrate the need for strict criteria to govern the selection process. It is
inevitable that some parties will be unhappy with the selection of the district court
and district judge, but that does not mean that the JPML has committed error, let
alone that those decisions are sufficiently egregious as to warrant mandamus.
Moreover, it would be especially troublesome to open up appellate review
(beyond mandamus) of the JPML’s selection of particular district judges.
Obviously, plaintiffs’ counsel would prefer a judge who is believed to be proplaintiff, and defense counsel would prefer a judge who is believed to be prodefense. But surely that should not be a ground for challenge. The goal should be
to find an open-minded judge. Indeed, the JPML has in some instances rejected
parties’ recommendations for particular judges precisely because each side
appeared to be seeking a favorably disposed judge rather than a neutral one.79
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
In fact, recent statistics show that a majority of requests for MDL treatment are denied. See
Calendar Year Statistics January through December 2019, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIG. 3 (2019), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics2019_1.pdf (out of forty-eight motions for centralization filed, only twenty-one were granted). And,
presumably, parties do not ask for MDL treatment unless there are at least plausible arguments that
the commonality and convenience factors are satisfied.
78
§ 1407(a).
79
See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1100–01
(J.P.M.L. 1992) (transferring cases to district judge whom neither side had urged because of “an
acrimonious dispute among counsel” which “has caused the parties and counsel on each side to
76
77
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As noted, there has been criticism that the JPML is not sufficiently
sensitive to diversifying the group of judges selected to handle MDLs.80 But as
one commentator has noted, in recent years, the JPML “appears to be making a
concerted effort to expand the gender and racial composition of the pool of MDL
transferee judges.”81 Although there is certainly room for more diversity among
MDL judges, I believe that the codification of criteria, such as race or sex-specific
criteria, would be unwise. Such criteria would be extremely difficult to craft and
would ultimately hamper the JPML’s effort to find the best judge for a particular
set of cases. Nonetheless, judges, attorneys, and scholars should continue to speak
out about the importance of diversity in the JPML’s selection of MDL judges.
It is, of course, possible to imagine hypothetical scenarios in which the
selection of a particular district judge would be sufficiently egregious as to warrant
mandamus. For instance, it would be intolerable if the JPML were to assign a set
of cases to a judge whose daughter or son is lead counsel for the defendant in all
of the cases. But I know of no situation in which such a flagrantly improper
assignment has occurred. The members of the JPML are carefully selected by the
Chief Justice, and there is simply no evidence that they are prone to make mistakes
of this sort. In all events, for an egregious error, such as one involving a clear
conflict of interest, the statute’s existing mandamus remedy is sufficient to ensure
that the parties are not prejudiced.
Even if there were strong grounds for arguing in favor of more precise
criteria to govern the JPML’s decisions, it is hard to imagine what a proposed
statutory or rule change would look like. Any attempt to codify specific criteria
would only hamper the JPML’s ability to look at all the facts and circumstances of
a particular set of cases.
Turning first to the decision whether to centralize, it would be extremely
difficult to codify criteria beyond the general formulations in the statute.
“Commonality” is itself a term fraught with ambiguity. For instance, even among
the members of the Supreme Court, there is a serious dispute about what
commonality means (in the class action context). In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes,82 the majority held that a common question must be one that has “the
capacity . . . to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation.”83 The dissent, by contrast, accused the majority of articulating a test
for predominance, not for commonality.84 In short, it is difficult to envision a “one
size fits all” definition of commonality.

harbor a perception that they would be unfairly affected by selection of any of the suggested
forums”); see also In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355–
56 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (rejecting the argument that a judge in the Eastern District of Louisiana would be
biased as an MDL judge overseeing the Deepwater Horizon litigation).
80
See Coleman, supra note 75, at 635.
81
Coleman, supra note 75, at 651.
82
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
83
Id. at 350 (citation omitted; emphasis in original).
84
Id. at 378 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the Dukes majority
for “importing a ‘dissimilarities’ notion suited to Rule 23(b)(3) into the Rule 23(a) commonality
inquiry”).
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The convenience criteria would be even more difficult to codify. Almost
any MDL will be convenient for some parties and witnesses but inconvenient for
others. That is the necessary implication of a system that allows centralization of
cases from multiple parts of the country. The weight that should be given to the
location of witnesses and evidence, the convenience to major airports, the
convenience to the parties, or the host of other considerations that the JPML
considers will depend on the circumstances of the particular cases. A determination
of convenience in the MDL context is an inherently discretionary and fact-specific
one that is not suitable for rigid rules. The same is true for the justice and efficiency
criteria.
With respect to the selection of the district court, it would be next to
impossible to codify the criteria that should govern, given that so many factors can
come into play. As discussed above, factors that may determine the selection of
the district court could include, in a particular case, workload considerations; prior
assignment of some of the cases; convenience to related state cases (or related
federal criminal or bankruptcy cases); the location of parties, witnesses, and
counsel; the location of pertinent evidence; and many others. Considerations
relevant to the selection of the judge could potentially include all of the
aforementioned factors, as well as the judge’s prior experience in the subject area;
the judge’s prior experience in MDLs or other complex litigation; and the judge’s
own caseload. A statute or rule that attempted to prioritize these and other criteria
would almost certainly be counterproductive. As with the decision whether to
create an MDL in the first place, the decisions regarding the selection of the district
court and district judge are inherently discretionary and not suitable for
codification.
Another downside of codifying strict criteria is that, to satisfy those
requirements (and avoid mandamus challenges), the JPML would need to write far
more elaborate opinions. That would increase substantially the time and effort
required by the JPML to decide each request for MDL treatment. The need for indepth opinions would be even greater if the statute were amended to authorize
appeals of JPML decisions (and not just mandamus petitions). Yet, the members
of the JPML are all sitting federal judges with their own caseloads, and it makes
little sense to put them to the burden of having to issue elaborate opinions to justify
what, in the end, are gut-level decisions about whether to transfer (and if so, to
whom).
Finally, appellate review is especially unwarranted given the composition
of the JPML. The typical appellate scenario (other than in rare cases involving
three-judge district court panels) is a decision by one district judge, reviewed by a
three-judge appellate panel. Here, the JPML consists of seven district court and
appellate judges, hand-picked by the Chief Justice because of their impeccable
credentials and experience. At least four of the seven judges must agree to any
decision for it to be binding,85 and the vast majority of the JPML’s decisions are
unanimous.86 An appeal from seven federal judges to a panel of three would be
85
86

28 U.S.C. § 1407(d).
John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2235
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strange enough in any circumstance, but in the MDL context, such a scenario
would be especially questionable. The JPML has vast experience deciding whether
to create an MDL and to whom the cases should be assigned. It is highly unlikely
that a randomly selected three-judge appellate panel, entrusted with the task of
second-guessing the JPML’s decisions, would bring comparable experience to
bear on the issues.
CONCLUSION
The status quo is a bit disquieting: it gives the JPML essentially
unreviewable discretion over decisions of profound importance that it must make
dozens of times each year. 87 And, at least superficially, the JPML’s written
opinions at times appear to be inconsistent or even contradictory. But the
alternative to the status quo—rigid criteria and expanded appellate review—would
be far worse.
The MDL process is not perfect, but the JPML is performing its tasks well.
In my view, it would be unwise to adopt statutory or rule changes to constrain the
JPML’s discretion in rendering the important decisions that it must make.

(2008) (“[O]ver the past two decades, nearly every one of [the JPML’s] decisions has been
unanimous.”).
87
For example, in 2019, the JPML decided forty-eight motions for centralization. In 2018, it decided
fifty-six such motions. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., supra note 77, at 3.
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